23/07/18 (Un)commoning the police: security in Xela’s barrios

“In our street, unfortunately next to our house, a clandestine bar has been functioning for the past 11 years, the owner of this bar is actually Mr (…) who ironically works as a policeman.” This remark comes from a formal letter (to which I was granted access) written by a vecino of Quetzaltenango’s urban periphery. The letter was addressed to the coordinator of his neighborhood’s Comité Comunal de Desarrollo (Cocode) who took upon himself the voluntary task to convey these and similar complaints to the city mayor. The statement is just one of the many examples in which Xela citizens express their distrust towards its police, the Policía Nacional Civil (PNC). During my work on commoning security I encountered various forms of collective mobilization by vecinos to strengthen the security in their neighborhoods, but all in one way or the other seek the active engagement of the state. This means not only more effective policing by the PNC but also the improvement of urban space and services, such as street pavements, maintenance, and public lighting, or the closing down of hotspots of neighborly harassment and illicit activities such as bars or brothels.

This means that the commoning of security by collective action of Xela’s urbanites has its limitations because it depends, in the end, on security organized by the state. However, the PNC is more often than not incapable or unwilling to take on this role. The distrust towards the police rests above all on its perceived ineptitude and corruption. Within the police, one easily finds examples of what I call ‘internal abandonment’. There is no doubt that the resources of the PNC and the working conditions of many policemen and -women are extremely precarious. Patrol cars are few, and often broken down or worn down. Salaries are low (around €350 a month for the lowest ranks). Police officers regularly pay from their own pockets for uniforms, station internet connections, fuel, vehicle repair, and even ammunition. This hinders the effectiveness of the institution and eats into the motivation of the force. “That’s why the population has low trust in the institution”, a dismayed officer told me during a nightly interview in his subestación. Yet, he was not prepared to give up: a round of fundraising among his ‘friends’ in the neighborhood enabled him to improve the premises of the small station to make the working environment a bit more tolerable.

What goes around comes around. If the PNC at the urban grass roots is starved of material and human resources, ineptitude and corruption will follow suit, trust will stay low, and residents’ collective action for security will remain an uphill battle.

Kees Koonings